Introduction
We present a nonparametric revealed preference characterization of non-unitary household consumption models that are identi…ed by varying degrees of cooperation. This characterization allows us to develop a practical method for analyzing a whole spectrum of noncooperative-cooperative consumption models. In addition, it enables us to derive some interesting theoretical results, such as independence (or non-nestedness) of consumption models with di¤erent degrees of cooperation. We use our method to analyze household consumption data taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst empirical application of consumption models that account for household behavior that is not fully cooperative. This introductory section motivates our main research questions, and relates them to the existing literature.
Non-unitary household consumption and cooperation. There is a growing consensus that multi-person household consumption behavior should no longer be treated as if it the household were a single decision maker that optimizes a household utility function subject to the household budget constraint. Indeed, this so-called unitary model of household consumption imposes empirically testable restrictions on the household demand function (e.g. Slutsky symmetry) that are frequently rejected when confronted with consumption or labor supply data of multi-person households. See, for example, Fortin and Lacroix (1997) , Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008) .
Because of these empirical problems of the unitary model, an emerging literature explicitly acknowledges that households are composed of distinct individuals who are endowed with their own preferences, and that household consumption decisions are determined by an underlying intrahousehold decision mechanism. We refer to this approach as the non-unitary approach to household consumption. Typically, nonunitary consumption models allow for privately consumed goods as well as publicly consumed goods within the household. In addition, following Apps and Rees (1988) and Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , the usual assumption is that household allocations are Pareto e¢ cient; in the household consumption literature, Pareto e¢ ciency corresponds to the so-called cooperative within-household solution of the intrahousehold allocation problem. 1 However, the Pareto e¢ ciency assumption has been questioned for the publicly consumed goods. Most notably, it has been argued that the informational requirement and the resulting cost of implementing cooperation may often be unrealistic. See, for example, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2007) and Preston (2005, 2008) . In this paper we develop a framework for distinguishing between di¤erent non-unitary consumption models in terms of the degree of cooperation. At this point, it is worth noting that we see at least two reasons why it is important to know the magnitude of intrahousehold cooperation. First, from a welfarist perspective, it gives an idea of the welfare improvement that is possible within a certain household. If it is possible to link the level of cooperation to household characteristics, it may be possible to use this knowledge for welfare enhancement measures that correct the e¢ -ciency loss originating from household behavior that is not fully cooperative. Second, the issue has also important implications for the structure of optimal taxation and policies that target to alter the intrahousehold income distribution. See, for example, Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) for a discussion on such targeting issues in a non-unitary setting. In this respect, di¤erent (cooperative-noncooperative) consumption models may lead to other intrahousehold allocations. In fact, the literature has revealed a need for non-unitary household consumption models situated between a fully cooperative case and a fully noncooperative situation, in order to obtain a realistic modeling of observed behavior. See, for example, d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009) for discussion.
In what follows, we will provide a characterization of the whole cooperativenoncooperative spectrum. At the one extreme, the fully cooperative solution corresponds to the Pareto e¢ cient within-household allocation mentioned before. At the other extreme, the fully noncooperative solution corresponds to a Nash equilibrium allocation within the household. Finally, we also characterize the semicooperative case, which is situated on a continuum between the cooperative case and the noncooperative case. We will argue that our characterization of this semicooperative case has a natural interpretation in terms of the degree of cooperation within the household.
The cooperative-noncooperative spectrum: literature review. By now, the modeling of the fully cooperative case is quite complete. Browning and Chiappori (1998) provide a local di¤erential characterization of the cooperative model. A general …nding is that if the household acts cooperatively, then the unitary condition of Slutsky symmetry no longer holds. By contrast, cooperative behavior imposes that there exists a household pseudo-Slutsky matrix that can be decomposed as the sum of a symmetric negative semi-de…nite matrix and a matrix of rank 1 (in the case of two household members). As shown by Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) , this condition, together with homogeneity and adding up, is also locally su¢ cient for the existence of individual utility functions and Pareto weights that reproduce the observed behavior. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2009a ,b) complement these local di¤erential results by presenting a global revealed preference characterization of the same cooperative model. In the tradition of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) , 2 they derived necessary and su¢ cient conditions for household consumption data to be consistent with the model. For the publicly consumed quantities, these conditions require the existence of suitable Lindahl prices such that each individual in the household satis…es the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp; see Section 2) when using these individual Lindahl prices to evaluate the public goods.
At the other extreme of the spectrum, the fully noncooperative model assumes that each individual within the household maximizes her/his own utility given the consumption of the other household members. In this case, the household consumption decision is determined by the Nash equilibrium solution with voluntary contributions for the publicly consumed goods. See, among others, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) , Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2007) and Preston (2005, 2008) . As for the (local) di¤erential characterization of this model, data consistency with the noncooperative model requires the existence of a pseudo-Slutsky matrix that can be decomposed as a symmetric negative semide…nite matrix and a matrix with rank less than the number of public goods plus 1 (again in the case of two household members). Three remarks are important in view of our following exposition. First, at present it is not known whether these noncooperative conditions are also (locally) su¢ cient. Second, these noncooperative conditions are nested with the (di¤erential) cooperative conditions mentioned above: data consistency with the cooperative conditions always implies data consistency with the noncooperative conditions, but not vice versa. Finally, to the best of our knowledge a complementary global revealed preference characterization of the noncooperative household consumption model is nonexistent in the literature. 3 Between the two (cooperative and noncooperative) extremes, we can conceive a continuum of semicooperative cases. These cases di¤er in the degree to which a certain household member behaves cooperatively towards the other household members. We are aware of only one study that investigates these intermediate cases. Speci…-cally, d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009) consider a semicooperative model where the willingness to pay for public goods is between the Lindahl price vector associated with the cooperative equilibrium and the market price vector. Focusing on the local di¤erential characterization of this semicooperative behavior, they also derive corresponding rank conditions on the pseudo-Slutsky matrix. We will discuss the characterization of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira in more depth when we relate it to our characterization of semicooperative behavior. At this point, it is important to indicate that the above three remarks for the noncooperative model extend to the semicooperative model of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira. This study. We will develop an alternative framework for modeling household consumption behavior characterized by varying degrees of cooperation; this framework will contain the fully cooperative model and the fully noncooperative model as limiting cases. We will explicitly discuss the relationship between our framework and the one of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009). In contrast to most research in the literature, we focus on the revealed preference characterization of (cooperative, noncooperative and semicooperative) consumption behavior.
The revealed preference approach has a number of attractive features. First of all, our characterization is global, which contrasts with the local characterization obtained by the standard di¤erential approach. Speci…cally, we get global conditions that enable checking consistency of a given data set with a particular consumption model; in the spirit of Varian (1982) , we refer to this as 'testing' data consistency with the model under study. Second, we are able to verify these conditions while keeping their inherent nonparametric nature, i.e. the associated tests do not require an a priori (typically non-veri…able) parametric speci…cation of the intrahousehold decision process (e.g. individual preferences). By contrast, the di¤erential approach (until present) usually maintains additional assumptions concerning the functional form for the demand function (and thus individual preferences) when verifying the abovementioned rank conditions of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix (e.g. Browning and Chiappori (1998) start from a quadratic almost ideal demand system in their empirical analysis). More speci…cally, our nonparametric tests apply mixed integer programming (MIP) methods, which combine linear constraints with binary integer variables. This MIP formulation is particularly attractive from a practical point of view: for a given data set, it allows for testing data consistency with a speci…c consumption model by applying standard MIP solution techniques.
Two further features imply notable di¤erences with the di¤erential results described above. First, the testable revealed preference conditions are not only necessary but also su¢ cient for data consistency with speci…c (cooperative, noncooperative and semicooperative) consumption models. Second, we will show that the conditions for the semicooperative model (or, in a limiting case, the conditions of the fully noncooperative model) are not nested with the cooperative conditions: data consistency with the (global) semicooperative conditions is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for data consistency with the (global) cooperative conditions. This makes it interesting to compare the empirical validity of di¤erent models. In fact, we can meaningfully verify data consistency with a given model (and compare di¤erent models) even if there are only a few observations and without restriction on the number of privately consumed goods (see Section 4.4 and Section 5).
We demonstrate the practical usefulness of our approach through an empirical application to data taken from the RLMS. As indicated above, as far as we know, this is the …rst application of noncooperative and semicooperative household consumption models to a real-life data set. Interestingly, this application demonstrates the empirical relevance of our theoretical insights on independence (or non-nestedness) of, on the one hand, the revealed preference conditions for the fully cooperative model and, on the other hand, the revealed preference conditions for other (not fully cooperative) models. As such, it motivates considering noncooperative and semicooperative models in addition to the (more common) cooperative model in empirical analysis of household consumption behavior.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. To set the stage, Section 2 recaptures the revealed preference characterization of individually rational behavior. Section 3 introduces a general household game concept, which applies to the consumption decisions of multi-person households. This concept will provide the starting point for our discussion in Section 4, which gives a revealed preference characterization of the cooperative-noncooperative spectrum introduced above. This section also discusses independence (or non-nestedness) between the conditions of non-unitary consumption models characterized by di¤erent degrees of cooperation. Section 5 introduces the MIP approach for empirical veri…cation of the di¤erent conditions, and presents our empirical application. Section 6 summarizes and formulates a number of concluding remarks.
The rational individual benchmark
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to the theory of revealed preferences. Speci…cally, we consider the optimization problem of a rational single individual. This will ease our following discussion of non-unitary consumption models, which assume rational individuals.
Consider an individual with a utility function U . Throughout, we will assume that utility functions U are continuous, concave, non-satiated and non-decreasing in their arguments. Let T = f1; : : : ; jT jg be a set of observations. Given a (strictly positive) price vector p t and income Y t (t 2 T ), we assume that the rational individual chooses the consumption bundle q in her/his budget set that maximizes her/his utility. In particular, the rational individual solves the following optimization problem (OP-I):
A data set S = fp t ; q t g t2T consists of a collection of strictly positive price vectors p t and a collection of positive demand vectors q t . We use the following concept of individual-rationalizability.
De…nition 1 (individual-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fp t ; q t g t2T . The set S is individual-rationalizable if there exist a utility function U such that for all t 2 T , the bundle q t solves OP-I given the price vector p t and income Y t = hp t ;q t i. Varian (1982) established that the set S is individual-rationalizable if and only if it satis…es the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (garp).
De…nition 2 (garp) Consider a data set S = fp t ; q t g t2T . The set S satis…es garp if there exists a binary relation R such that the following holds. The following theorem is probably the single most important result in revealed preference theory (see Varian, 1982 , based on Afriat, 1967) .
Theorem 1 Consider a data set S = fp t ; q t g t2T . The following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists a utility function U that individual-rationalizes S.
S satis…es garp.
3. For all t 2 T , there exist a positive number U t and a strict positive number t such that, for all t; v 2 T ,
This result has two important implications. First, data consistency with garp is necessary and su¢ cient for individual-rationalizability of the data; see condition 2. Next, condition 3 provides an equivalent characterization in terms of the socalled Afriat inequalities, which allow an explicit construction of the utility levels associated with each observation t (i.e. utility level U t for observed q t ). In our following discussion of consumption models, we will mainly concentrate on the garp characterization of rational individual behavior. As we will show, this focus on garp enables us to formulate testable implications of consumption models in mixed integer programming (MIP) terms (see Section 5) . However, in principle our garp-based characterization of consumption models can equivalently be expressed in terms of Afriat inequalities (by building on Theorem 1; see also the proof of Theorem 4).
The household game
To keep our exposition simple, we focus on 2-person (A and B) households in what follows. However, extensions to households with more than 2 members are fairly straightforward. Individuals have to decide over the consumption of a bundle of jJj private goods (J = f1; : : : ; jJjg) and a bundle of jKj public goods (K = f1; : : : ; jKjg). Given private and public consumption in the household, the utility of the individuals A and B is given by the functions U A (q A ; Q A + Q B ) and The household consumption levels depend on the intrahousehold decision making process. As discussed in the Introduction, we will consider three types of non-unitary household models, which will have di¤erent equilibrium characterizations: the cooperative case, which assumes a Pareto e¢ cient intrahousehold solution; the noncooperative case, which assumes a noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution; and the semi-cooperative case, which is situated on a continuum between the cooperative and the non-cooperative solutions. To formalize this idea, we will discuss the three models as particular cases of what we call the household game. Essentially, this household game describes each consumption decision as resulting from a two-step process. In a certain sense, this two-step representation generalizes the two-step representation of the cooperative consumption model; see, for example, Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 . Just like for the cooperative model, it is important to remark that our two-step representation of the household game should not necessarily correspond to the actual decision making process within the household. We only assume that observed household behavior can be represented as if it follows from a two-step procedure.
In the …rst step of the household game, the total household income Y is divided between A and B, which de…nes the individual incomes
In this study, we abstract from explicitly modeling this …rst step. In general, however, this intrahousehold income distribution can be seen as a function of exogenous variables such as prices, household expenditures and other variables that a¤ect household decisions but not the preferences or the household budget (i.e.
so-called extra-environmental parameters in the terminology of McElroy (1990) or distribution factors in the terminology of Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene (1994) ). In the second step, each individual (A and B) decides on the optimal level of the own private consumption and the own contribution to the level of public goods, by maximizing her/his own utility subject to a personalized budget constraint de…ned by the individual income. In doing so, the individual faces the price vectors p and P for her/his choice of private consumption and public contribution. In addition, in the general version of the household game, each individual receives a donation from the other individual per unit of public good that she/he purchases. We denote these donations for each good k 2 K by ) refer to the degree of (voluntary or obligatory) cooperation within the household. This donation concept will play a crucial role in our further exposition. Speci…cally, it will allow us to characterize a whole spectrum of cooperative-noncooperative household consumption models.
The empirical analysis of the household game starts from a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . For every observation t 2 T , the vectors Q t and q t (= q A t + q B t ) represent the household bundles of public and private goods demanded at t; and we write q t;j , and Q t;k for the demanded quantity of private good j or public good k at t (j 2 J, k 2 K). Thus, using p t for the (strictly positive) price vector of the private commodities, P t for the (strictly positive) price vector of the public commodities and Y t for household income, the household faces the following budget constraint:
The …rst step of the household game then de…nes the individual incomes In what follows, we de…ne an equilibrium of the household game as an allocation fq represent the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the bundle of public goods associated with A and B. In particular,P A t;k represents the amount of income that A is willing to give up (at equilibrium) in order to receive one additional unit of the public good k. For each public good k (which is consumed by a strictly positive amount), the …rst order equilibrium conditions for OP-H.A and OP-H.B (for Q t;k > 0) imply
This equality requirement is easily interpreted as an equilibrium condition. To see this, let us consider the two possible inequality situations. First, ifP A t;k + B t;k > P t;k then the MWTP of A for one additional unit of k (i.e.P A t;k ) is larger than the price A has to pay for it (i.e. P t;k B t ). Hence, A will increase her/his contribution to good k. A directly similar interpretation applies to the situationP B t;k + A t;k > P t;k . And, thus, maxfP
t;k g < P t;k then either A or B (whoever contributes positively to good k) will want to decrease her/his contribution to k. Again, this implies a disequilibrium situation.
As a concluding remark, we point out two assumptions that we will maintain in the next two sections. First, we will assume that the empirical analyst only observes the aggregate private demands q t , and not the individual bundles q A t and q B t . However, it is easy to extend our analysis to include information on q A t and q B t , i.e. the private consumption of the individuals A and B is partly observed. See our empirical application in Section 5 for a speci…c example. Next, we will assume that all components of the aggregate demands Q t are strict positive. Again, we could 6 If U A and U B are not di¤erentiable, we can take the subdi¤erentials that characterize the optimal allocation. easily relax this assumption by introducing some additional notation, but this would only complicate the discussion while not really adding any new insights. In fact, our empirical application in Section 5 will consider data sets with some components of Q t equal to zero; our basic theoretical insights developed below apply with equal strength to this setting.
The cooperative-noncooperative spectrum
The household game discussed in the previous section allows us to provide a revealed preference characterization of a whole spectrum of cooperative-noncooperative models of household consumption. As indicated above, di¤erent degrees of intrahousehold cooperation then correspond to di¤erent speci…cations of the intrahousehold donations (i.e.
A k and B k ). To formalize this idea, we …rst discuss the two extreme cases mentioned in the Introduction, i.e. the fully cooperative model and the fully noncooperative model. Subsequently, we present the semicooperative model, which is situated on a continuum between these two limiting models.
The cooperative solution
The cooperative model assumes that the household consumption decision coincides with a Pareto optimal allocation. An allocation fq 0A ; q 0B ; Q 0A + Q 0B g that satisfy the same household budget
). For our setting with concave utility functions, a Pareto optimal allocation fq In what follows, we brie ‡y recapture this characterization by integrating it with the household game framework set out in the previous section. This will set the stage for our next discussion of the noncooperative and semicooperative models. As discussed in the previous section, the household game de…nes an equilibrium bundle fq . Now assume that (in equilibrium) A considers to buy an additional unit of good k. In order to pay for this extra consumption, A receives from B a contribution of B t;k . In a cooperative equilibrium, a natural assumption is that B pays according to her/his valuation of this extra consumption. In other words, B agrees to pay exactly her/his MWTP for this additional consumption; and this value is given by P B t;k . Thus, for the cooperative solution we have
so that the equilibrium condition (1) becomes
In words, for every public good k and at each observation t, the sum of the MWTP of individuals A and B (P A t;k andP B t;k ) must equal the price P t;k . As such,P A t;k and P B t;k can be interpreted as Lindahl prices and, thus, in this case the household game equilibrium corresponds to an equilibrium with Lindahl prices. This conforms to the well-known one-to-one correspondence between Lindahl price equilibria (with varying incomes Y Given all this, we can next introduce the revealed preference characterization of this cooperative consumption model. We …rst de…ne the concept of cooperativerationalizability.
De…nition 3 (cooperative-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The set S is cooperative-rationalizable if there exist utility functions U A and U B , individual private consumption bundles q The next result gives the revealed preference conditions corresponding with such cooperative-rationalizability.
Theorem 2 Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists a pair of utility functions U A , U B that cooperative-rationalizes S. 
For all t 2 T , there exist price vectorsP
Thus, for a given data set S, if we can identify q 7 In what follows, we will see that this identi…ability result does not hold in general for consumption models that are not fully cooperative.
The noncooperative solution
Fully noncooperative household behavior means that individual A is not willing to contribute to the purchase of Q B and vice versa, which implies A t = B t = 0. In this instance, the programs OP-H.A and OP-H.B correspond to the usual de…nition of a Nash equilibrium; see, for example, Preston (2005, 2008) . Given 
The interpretation of this condition is directly analogous to the one of (1) discussed above. Let us then consider the revealed preference conditions of this noncooperative model for a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . Similar to before, we de…ne the concept of noncooperative-rationalizability.
De…nition 4 (noncooperative-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The set S is noncooperative-rationalizable if there exist utility functions U A and U B , individual private consumption bundles q We obtain the following result.
Theorem 3 Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists a pair of utility functions U A , U B that noncooperative-rationalizes
S.
2. For all t 2 T and k 2 K; there exist price vectorsP Two further remarks are in order. First, if we had imposed the additional assumption that for all t 2 T and k 2 K the contributions Q The …nal remark pertains to our earlier discussion of (3) for the cooperative model. We have indicated that, in principle, under cooperative-rationalizability the (unobserved) within-household income distribution (i.e. the sharing rule) can be identi…ed from the observed set S. This identi…ability result does not generally hold under noncooperative-rationalizability. Speci…cally, it directly follows from the budget constraints in OP-H.A and OP-H.B that, under noncooperative-rationalizability, the income shares of the two individuals are given by:
Given this, conditions NC.4 and NC.5 imply that Y t that are consistent with a noncooperative-rationalization of the given data set. These bounds then account for the total (non-assignable) expenditures on the jointly contributed public goods.
The semicooperative solution
In contrast to the cooperative and noncooperative cases discussed before, there is no obvious way to model semicooperative household consumption behavior. In this section, we forward a model that extends the interpretation of the previous (limiting) models to situations characterized by intermediate levels of intrahousehold cooperation. We believe this model captures most characteristics of both models in a realistic and intuitive way. To enhance the intuition of the model, we will compare it with -to the best of our knowledge-the only alternative semicooperative model that has been suggested in the literature, i.e. 
1.
Let us interpret this semicooperative model in terms of the household game described above. Assume that (in equilibrium) individual A wants to increase her/his contribution to public good k by one unit, and individual B's MWTP for this increase isP B t;k . However, individual B is not fully cooperative and, thus, she/he is unwilling to pay this entire amount to A when purchasing the additional public good. On the other hand, she/he is not fully noncooperative either. Therefore, individual B will contribute 
The intuition of this condition is directly similar to the one of (1), which was explained before. We remark that we can haveP B t;k +P A t;k > P t;k for some k if A t;k 6 = 0 or B t;k 6 = 0. Like for the fully noncooperative case, such an inequality indicates an e¢ ciency loss due to limited cooperation.
Let us then formulate the corresponding revealed preference conditions. We …rst de…ne the concept of semicooperative-rationalizability.
De…nition 5 (semicooperative-rationalizability) Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The set S is semicooperative-rationalizable if there exist The following theorem characterizes the collection of data sets that are semicooperativerationalizable.
Theorem 4 Consider a data set S = fp t ; P t ; q t ; Q t g t2T . The following conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists a pair of utility functions U A , U B that semicooperative-rationalizes S. . In other words, if individual B's MWTP for some good k 1 is twice her/his MWTP for some other good k 2 , then her/his contribution per unit of k 1 will also be twice as large as her/his contribution per unit of k 2 . Although it is also possible to relax this assumption (again at the cost of additional computational burden), we will stick to it as we believe it is quite intuitive and plausible in the current context.
For all t 2 T and k 2 K; there exist numbers
As a …nal note, it is useful to compare our model with the one of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009). Consider a data set S and let fq 
This equilibrium condition is closely similar to the condition (6) that applies to our model. However, there is one crucial di¤erence. Speci…cally, in the model of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira the intrahousehold donations per unit of any public good k (captured by A and B in (7)) is proportional to the MWTP for this public good in the Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium ( A t;k and B t;k in (7)). By contrast, in our model these donations are proportional to the MWTP for the same goods in the semicooperative equilibrium (P A t;k andP B t;k in (6)). Thus, depending on the value of A and B , the two models may lead to di¤erent outcomes. In addition, our above discussion makes clear that the two semicooperative models have a rather di¤erent interpretation, even though they have a similar structure. A main motivation to focus on our version of the semicooperative model, and not on the one of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira, is that our model only uses information on the MWTP for quantities that are e¤ectively observed (i.e. in the data set S), while the alternative model of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira requires information on the MWTP for quantities in some unobserved cooperative equilibrium (associated with the same data set S). The fact that we only use observ-able quantity information is interesting from a practical point of view. Speci…cally, as we will explain in Section 5, it allows us to reformulate the revealed preference condition in Theorem 4 in MIP terms. As far as we can see, it is not possible to obtain a similar MIP formulation for the revealed preference characterization of the model of d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira, precisely because this model requires unobservable quantity information.
Independence
We can show that the revealed preference conditions for noncooperative behavior are independent of the revealed preference conditions for cooperative behavior: a data set that satis…es the cooperative conditions does not necessarily satisfy the noncooperative conditions, and vice versa. Speci…cally, the two examples in Appendix 2 show that there is neither any inclusion nor any exclusion relation between the collection of data sets that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 2 and the collection of data sets that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3. For simplicity, these examples focus on the (limiting) fully cooperative and fully noncooperative cases. However, in principle we can construct similar (but substantially more complex) examples that pertain to the (intermediate) semicooperative model characterized in Theorem 4. Thus, we can conclude that models characterized by di¤erent degrees of cooperation are generally independent of each other.
This independence/non-nestedness conclusion is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, this result stands in sharp contrast with the …ndings in the (local) di¤erential approach to modeling non-unitary consumption behavior. As discussed in the Introduction, the rationalizability conditions for the noncooperative and semicooperative models derived in that approach are generally nested with the rationalizability conditions for the cooperative model: if a given data set passes the (local) condition for cooperative rationalizability, then it should also pass the test for noncooperative rationalizability, but not vice versa. Secondly, our empirical application in Section 5 will show that this independence is not a theoretical curiosity but also has empirical relevance. Speci…cally, this application does e¤ectively include data that are cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperative-rationalizable, and (di¤erent) data that are noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperative-rationalizable.
Apart from independence, the examples in Appendix 2 demonstrate two further features of our revealed preference conditions that are important in view of empirical applications. First, they show that we can meaningfully test data consistency with speci…c household consumption models (and compare the empirical validity of di¤erent models) even if only a few observations are available. Second, because all consumption is public in both examples, such empirical analysis in principle does not require privately consumed goods. In fact, this last feature implies an additional di¤erence with the existing di¤erential characterizations of noncooperative and semicooperative models: these di¤erential characterizations typically require (much) more privately consumed goods than publicly consumed goods in order to obtain empirically testable restrictions; see Preston (2005, 2008 ) and d'Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009).
Empirical application
We apply our method to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2009b,c) studied the same data set. These authors focused on consistency of these data with the cooperative model of household consumption. We extend these earlier studies by providing complementary results pertaining to noncooperative and semicooperative consumption models. In doing so, we also generalize the MIP methodology introduced by these authors (for the cooperative case) to apply to models of noncooperative and semicooperative household behavior.
Our following analysis will concentrate on consistency testing, and will particularly illustrate the empirical relevance of the independence result articulated above (see Section 4.4). If household behavior is found consistent with a particular (cooperative-noncooperative) model, then subsequent analysis can focus on recovering/identifying the speci…cities of the decision model that underlies the (rationalizable) observed consumption behavior. For brevity, we do not consider recovery issues in this application. However, we will return to recovery (based on our MIP methodology) in the concluding section.
Veri…cation
To be able to verify the garp conditions in Theorems 2-4, we reformulate these conditions in mixed integer programming (MIP) terms. We focus on formulating the MIP program for the semicooperative model, with endogenous variables 
has a straightforwardly similar meaning as q t Rq v in Section 2). Then, a data set S satis…es the necessary and su¢ cient condition for semicooperativerationalizability in Theorem 4 if and only if the following MIP problem is feasible:
For all t; v 2 T and all k 2 K, there exist strictly positive vectorsP 
(
with C t > P t;k and C t > Y t for all t and k:
The interpretation is as follows. Constraint (12) imposes that the private consumption bundles q (14) imposes transitivity of the individual revealed preference relations If we do not know these values (which is usually the case), then we suggest to conduct a grid search that checks the above problem (through MIP methods) for 10 The strict inequality p t ; q B obtaining a semicooperative-rationalizability of the given data set has at least size ". Then, we get that any random draw out of [0; 1] [0; 1] has at least probability " to lead to a rationalization. In other words, with probability less then
(1 ") no rationalization is found. So, if we take n random draws from [0; 1] [0; 1], then with probability at least 1 (1 ") n , we must …nd a rationalization. By taking n large enough, we can make this probability as close to 1 as desirable for any given ". In our following application, we will use an equally sparsed grid search with step 0:1 for A ; B 2 [0; 1], which implies n = 121:
Data
We refer to Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2009b,c) for a detailed discussion of the RLMS data that we use. These authors also provide more speci…c information on the assignability procedure that we present below. For compactness, we restrict ourselves to a brief summary here. Our sample consists of 148 adult couples, with both (female and male) household members employed. We consider each of the 148 households separately, which avoids (often debatable) preference homogeneity assumptions across male or female members of di¤erent households. This illustrates the use of our method for a panel data set. However, it is worth emphasizing that revealed preference methods such as ours are equally applicable to (repeated) cross-section data sets. In this respect, we refer to Crawford (2003, 2008) for some recent methodological advances.
Our data set covers the period from 1994 to 2003. We have consumption data for each year except for the years 1997 and 1999, so that we end up with 8 (= jT j) observations (prices and quantities) per household. We consider bundles consisting of 21 (= jJj + jKj) nondurable goods: (1) food outside the home, (2) clothing, (3) car fuel, (4) wood fuel, (5) gas fuel, (6) luxury goods, (7) services, (8) housing rent, (9) bread, (10) potatoes, (11) vegetables, (12) fruit, (13) (21) tobacco. We assume that wood fuel, gas fuel and housing rent are public (jKj = 3), while the other goods are private (jJj = 18).
Our application will show the possibility of including speci…c information on q Essentially, the procedure starts from a base scenario for the distribution of the privately consumed quantities across the two household members. Because assignable quantity information is not directly available from the RLMS data set, this base scenario uses the observed consumption of male and female singles (or one-person households). 11 In subsequent steps, we consider less and less assignability, i.e. we account for (ever larger) deviations from the base scenario distribution. Formally, using q bM t for the private quantities of member M that correspond to the hypothesized base scenario, we de…ne
with 0 1. The parameter captures the extent to which we allow for deviations from the base scenario distribution. For example, = 1 implies q aM t = q bM t , while < 1 implies q aM t < q bM t . Generally, lower values imply less stringent restrictions for the private quantities. Varying the value of will allow us to compare di¤erent cooperative-noncooperative models under varying degrees of assignability.
Results
To structure our discussion, we …rst provide empirical results for the (limiting Table 1 presents pass rates for the cooperative model and the noncooperative model under di¤erent degrees of assignability (captured by ). The table reveals that pass rates increase if decreases. This is not surprising given that lower values comply with less assignable information for the privately consumed quantities. For one household, we need = 0:60 for a rationalization in terms of the cooperative model as well as the noncooperative model. If we look at the aggregate pass rates in Table 1 , we do not …nd much di¤erence between the cooperative model and the noncooperative model. To some extent, this provides empirical support for both types of non-unitary models (conditional on the base scenario that is assumed).
Still, even though the two models provide a rather good overall …t of observed household behavior, there are some notable di¤erences for speci…c households. For example, for = 0:90 the noncooperative model rationalizes the behavior of two more households than the cooperative model, while for = 0:80 we observe a bet-ter …t of the cooperative model. Table 2 provides more detailed results pertaining to individual households. Speci…cally, it reports on (i) the number of households that are noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperative-rationalizable and (ii) the number of households that are cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperativerationalizable. The table suggest that the adequate behavioral model varies with the household under consideration: for some households the cooperative model provides a better …t of observed behavior than the noncooperative model, while the opposite holds for other households. Generally, this motivates the empirical relevance of considering noncooperative models of household behavior in addition to the (more common) cooperative model.
As a further base of comparison, we have also calculated power results for the different model speci…cations. Speci…cally, for each household and each we compute a power measure that quanti…es the probability of detecting random behavior. Random behavior is then modeled using a bootstrap method: for each observation, with given prices and income, we de…ne quantities by randomly drawing budget shares (for the 21 goods) from the set of 1184 (= 148 x 8) observed household choices. 12 Thus, our power assessment gives information on the expected distribution of violations under random choice, while incorporating information on the households' actual choices. Table 1 reports on the distribution of the power measure de…ned over the 148 households under study. These results are based on Monte Carlo-type simulations that include 1000 iterations. We …nd that the power varies a lot across households and models: while it is reasonably high for some households (see in particular the maximum and 3rd quartile values for higher ), it is also very low for other households (see the minimum and 1st quartile values). Generally, these results suggest that assignable quantity information can be particularly helpful to enhance the power of tests for non-unitary models (with or without cooperation). Next, we recall that our analysis uses only 8 observations per household. Obviously, power can only improve when more observations become available.
In the context of the present study, it seems particularly interesting to compare the power of the cooperative and noncooperative models. 13 For the data under consideration, we observe that the power distribution for the noncooperative model is situated somewhat below the one for the cooperative model for each value of . However, the di¤erence is very small; we can safely conclude that the power distributions are generally close to each other. In our opinion, this provides additional 12 See Bronars (1987) and Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006) for general discussions on alternative procedures to evaluate power in the context of revealed preference tests such as ours. 13 To compute the power results in Tables 1, we have used the same distribution of randomly drawn budget shares to evaluate the cooperative and noncooperative models. Obviously, this is needed to meaningfully compare the power of the two types of models. A similar quali…cation applies to the power results in Table 3. motivation for considering non-unitary models with limited cooperation in addition to the fully cooperative model.
[ Table 1 about here]
[ Table 2 about here]
As a …nal exercise, we consider the semicooperative model. Speci…cally, Table  3 reports on two households selected on the basis of the results in Table 2 : for = 1:00, household 1 can be rationalized in terms of the noncooperative model but not in terms of the cooperative model, and households 2 can be rationalized in terms of the cooperative model but not in terms of the noncooperative model. Table 3 gives test results (1 = pass; 0 = fail) and power estimates for the semicooperativerationalizability conditions corresponding to 121 combinations of A ; B 2 [0; 1], when using = 1:00.
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The results suggest that our methodology can be useful to de…ne bounds on the values of A and B that are consistent with semicooperative-rationalizable behavior for speci…c households. Given that A and B indicate the degree of cooperation of each individual household member, these bounds tell us about the extent to which observed household consumption behavior is characterized by (limited) intrahousehold cooperation. Interestingly, the results in Table 3 show that di¤erent household members may well be characterized by other degrees of cooperation in the semicooperative equilibrium (i.e. A and B have di¤erent bounds). In our opinion, an interesting following step can relate these …ndings on (varying) intrahousehold cooperation to speci…c characteristics of the household and/or household members. Such an exercise falls beyond the scope of the current study (also because of limited data availability). In this respect, our discussion in the concluding section will point out that combining experimental data with our methodology constitutes an interesting avenue for addressing this type of questions.
[ Table 3 about here]
Concluding discussion
We have presented a revealed preference toolkit for analyzing non-unitary household consumption behavior identi…ed by varying degrees of cooperation. We started from global characterizations of non-unitary rationalizable behavior, which complement the existing local di¤erential characterizations. Our toolkit allows for empirical analysis of such behavior while avoiding (typically nonveri…able) parametric structure for the household decision process. Such analysis can make use of MIP techniques, and is thus easy-to-implement. Our application to RLMS data suggests the empirical relevance of considering household consumption models that account for limited cooperation in addition to the (more common) model that assumes fully cooperative behavior.
To focus our discussion, we have concentrated on the characterization of consumption models with di¤erent degrees of cooperation, and testing consistency of observed behavior with alternative model speci…cations. If observed behavior is consistent with a particular model (i.e. can be rationalized), then a natural next question pertains to recovering/identifying the decision model that underlies the (rationalizable) observed consumption behavior. Such recovery can start from the MIP methodology presented in this paper. In this respect, see Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2009b) , who consider these questions for the cooperative model; their analysis is directly extended to the noncooperative and semicooperative models discussed here. Their basic argument is that nonparametric revealed preference recovery on the basis of an MIP characterization of rational behavior boils down to de…ning feasible sets characterized by the MIP constraints.
We see at least two interesting applications of recovery. First, recovery can focus on the individuals' MWTP for the publicly consumed goods. As indicated above, lack of intrahousehold cooperation implies that the sum of these individual MWTP deviates from the observed prices for the publicly consumed goods. The MIP method can be used for quantifying this discrepancy between MWTP and observed prices (as a measure for the e¢ ciency loss caused by limited cooperation) in empirical applications. Next, one can try to recover the income distribution that is associated with rationalizable behavior while accounting for limited cooperation. As a matter of fact, the literature on cooperative household consumption behavior has paid considerable attention to analyzing the intrahousehold distribution underlying observed cooperative-rationalizable behavior. See, for example, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005), Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) , who focus on various welfare-related questions associated with sharing rule recovery. The methodology presented in this paper allows for analyzing similar questions for noncooperative and semicooperative models. 15 Finally, the current study has concentrated on analyzing household consumption behavior. However, the same methodology can also be used to analyze multi-person group behavior. Indeed, a lot of situations involve groups of individuals spending a joint budget; e.g. decisions of committees, clubs, villages and other local organizations, or …rms with multiple decision makers. Ekeland (2006, 2009) suggest the cooperative (Pareto e¢ cient) model as a natural benchmark for assessing the collective rationality of such group decisions. Our methodology allows for assessing group decisions that do not meet this benchmark. In this respect, an interesting avenue for follow-up research consists of analyzing group consumption behavior on the basis of data gathered by means of a laboratory experiment. In fact, it has been argued that the nonparametric revealed preference methodology is particularly useful in combination with such experimental data. See, for example, Sippel (1997), Harbaugh, Krause and Berry (2001) and Andreoni and Miller (2002) for earlier applications that experimentally analyze individually rational behavior. For example, experiments can use our methodology to focus on speci…c conditions (e.g. individual and group characteristics or other exogenous circumstances that can be manipulated) that 'trigger'(di¤erent degrees of) cooperative/noncooperative behavior in multi-person consumption decisions.
The inequalities are replaced by equalities in case the quantities of the goods under consideration are strictly positive. Next, concavity of the utility functions U A and jointly contributed public goods.
U B implies for all t; v 2 T :
For all t 2 T , de…ne U 
Using Theorem 1, we know that these two conditions are equivalent to the conditions that fp t ;P 
De…ne the functions U A and U B such that:
Notice that U A and U B are continuous, concave, strictly monotone and that for all 
This provides the wanted result, i.e. fq 
Appendix 2: independence -examples
Throughout, we will use " to represent a strictly positive but su¢ ciently small number.
Example 1: cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperativerationalizable
We …rst construct a data set that is cooperative-rationalizable but not noncooperativerationalizable. The data set contains 3 observations (T = ft; v; wg) and 3 public goods (K = f1; 2; 3g). More speci…cally, the set S contains the following informa-tion: To show cooperative-rationalizability, we consider the following speci…cation:
This speci…cation clearly meets the conditionP
. By computing for both members all inner vector-products,P M s Q u (s; u 2 T; M = A; B); it is straightforward to verify that fP A t ; Q t g t2T and fP B t ; Q t g t2T both satisfy garp. As such the data set meets the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for cooperativerationalizability in Theorem 2.
We still need to prove that the data set S is not noncooperative-rationalizable. Recall that we must have max 
We conclude that the given data set does not meet the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for noncooperative-rationalizability in Theorem 3.
Example 2: noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperativerationalizable
We next construct a data set that is noncooperative-rationalizable but not cooperativerationalizable. Speci…cally, we consider the following data set S with 4 observations (T = ft; v; w; zg) and 4 public goods (K = f1; 2; 3; 4g): We …rst demonstrate that this data set is noncooperative-rationalizable. To see this, we consider the following speci…cation: K): Again, it is straightforward to verify that the sets fP A t ; Q t g t2T and fP B t ; Q t g t2T both satisfy garp. Therefore, we conclude that the given data set meets the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for noncooperative-rationalizability in Theorem 3.
Next, it can be veri…ed that the given data set does not pass the condition for consistency with the cooperative model that is given in Proposition 2 of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007); the reasoning is similar to the one in their Example 1. For brevity, we do not include the argument here, but it can be obtained upon request. We thus conclude that the given data set violates the necessary and su¢ cient condition in Theorem 2. 
